There has been some preemptory dismissal of those aspects of women's experience which they feel  to be "essentially moral" in favor of political-economic approaches.  This is not gainsaid by the numerous books and articles dealing with the moral problems of women and with moral problems facing both men and women.  These problems have been widely dicussed, especially by feminists, both in popular literature and in specialized academic modes, such as philosophical ethics.

Discussions in popular literature, although they use the terms like "right" ("A woman has the right to choose"), tend to move quickly from the moral dilemmas of women (e.g., "How, even supposing that I have the right to choose, should I choose?") to the political-economic programs of feminism designed to remove the restrictions and dominations placed upon women, to secure women's rights, among other things.  Thus, although in such literature there is a recognition of some of the moral elements in women's experience, these are not fully addressed as moral.  The "women" side of the Women and Morality relation is emphasized at the expense of the "morality" side.

Feminist discussions in the academic context of philosophical ethics--like nonfeminist discussions--have tended to emphasize the conceptual and casuistic aspects of the moral questions facing women, but at the expense of any thorough consideration of women's felt experience, as women, placed in the particular kinds of problems associated, at least in our society, with their femaleness.  The "moral" side of the Women and Morality relation is stressed while the "women" side is neglected.  To the extent that the "women" side is mentioned in this context, it is usually, again, stated as a commitment to the feminist program rather than as an analysis of women's moral experience.

In concentrating on such an analysis, this issue of Social Research emphasizes, from historical and contemporary perspectives, the context of recent social-scientific findings, notably the research of Carol Gilligan documented in her recent book, In a Different Voice:  Psychological Theory and Women's Development,[1] which, as the following contributions show, has provoked a variety of responses.

There has also been a tendency to patronize women's moral experience.  The principal perspective of studies of women's moral thought and experience in psychology and sociology, and even in the curricular and pedigogical literature of moral education, has been the traditional one positing women (whether or not they are considered significantly different from men) as objects of inquiry and little more.  When there is more, women become, in addition to objects of inquiry, objects of education or elements to be considered in public policy.  Even feminist studies within this mode seem to find it difficult to transcend this perspective.  Thus, for instance, Gilligan's In a Different Voice, extremely sympathetic though it is to its objects of study, does not move beyond a plea that the "second voice" be given a hearing.

It seems to us that now is a suitable time to bring together various perspectives, with specific attention to the "essentially moral" character of women's "felt" experience (whatever judgment one makes of that).  The time-honored, abstract, conceptual perspectives of normative and metaethics need to consider closely the data and explanations coming out of social science and vise versa; and such consideration needs to occur confronting, or at least bearing in mind, issues concerning methodology and assumptions in research and theorizing that have interested philosophers of social science.

This pursuit of a balanced, coherent perspective is shared by each of our contributers.  Ethical, historical, epistemological, psychological, sociological, methodological, and political inquiries have been blended in various combinations and various ways.  These blends have produced a variety of conclusions, but not, we think, without clarifying certain of the issues at stake, not least those raised by the questions: Is there a special relation between women and morality, and if so, what do we make of it?

Genevieve Lloyd provides a wide-ranging historico-philosophical survey of views of women's rationality and moral thinking; Linda Nicholson offers a more specific introduction to the emergence of some of the issues in the modern period.  Lorraine Code and Mary Ann O'Loughlin raise issues of general philosophical interest--epistemological and ethical respecitvely--in relation to the moral position of women.  Each of these authors takes note of the significance of recent social-scientific research.  Owen Flanagan and Jonathan Adler raise issues in ethical theory, concentrating on the psychological analyses of Kohlberg and Gilligan.  John Broughton continues the psychological discussion.  Finally, Debra Nails and James Walker raise issues of methodological and social concern, with Nail's contribution discussing methodological requirements in respect of social-scientific inquiry into women and morality and Walker's analyzing the relations between developmental theory, ethics, and feminist politics.

[1] Carol Gilligan. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Debra Nails, Mary Ann O'Loughlin, James Walker
Guest Editors